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Executive Summary
Concern about the effect of aging on long-term care has intensified, particularly
because aging has been accompanied by several changes that spur long-term
care output, including growth in demand subsidies, declining fertility rates,
rising female labor-force participation, and the deregulation of entry barriers to
the nursing home industry. This article summarizes our previous work on how
economic forces govern the demand for and supply of care, and extends it by
discussing how they are affected by public subsidies for long-term care. Aging
many times may lower the demand for market care by increasing the supply of
family-provided care, which substitutes for market care. This effect appears to
explain important trends in the output of long-term care over the past thirty
years. We document the exponential growth of public financing over the past
several decades and use our previous framework to argue that part of this
growth would have occurred even if eligibility for public subsidies had been
held constant. Private demand growth, by raising the private price of nursing
home care, provides incentives for people to qualify for public assistance and
expands the share of total demand that is publicly financed. Endogenous eligi-
bility and the private price pressure induced by aging have helped contribute
to the explosion in Medicaid budgets.
I.Introduction
In many countries around the world, the demographic transition into
reduced fertility and mortality has forced the private and public sectors
to grapple with the care of rapidly aging populations. Since 1960, the
share of the U.S. population above 65 years of age has grown substan-
tially, from about 9 percent to 14 percent. Even so, both the level and
growth of this share are lower in the United States than in other devel-
oped countries. For example, in many European nations, the elderly
population accounts for nearly one-fifth of the total population, and
growth in this share has been larger than in the United States over the78 Lakdawalla and Philipson
past few decades. As the elderly population has grown, the share of
public spending on long-term care for the elderly has grown as well,
both in absolute terms and as a share of total health spending. In 1960,
public expenditure on long-term care in the United States accounted
for only 2 percent of health care spending, but in 1996 it accounted for
10 percent.1
Concern about the growing importance of long-term care has been
reflected in several major public policy trends over the past few de-
cades. First, the share of output financed publicly through Medicaid
has grown enormously, from about 23 percent of 1972 nursing home
bed-days to about 75 percent of 1991 bed-days.2 Second, toward the
mid-I 980s, entry and investment barriers in the nursing home indus-
try, erected by Certificate of Need Laws, were relaxed considerably; the
resulting increase in the supply of nursing home beds also served to ex-
pand the output of long-term care.3 These public policies have served
to expand the demand for and the supply of nursing homes.
Surprisingly, however, the public expansion of nursing home care
has not boosted the use of nursing homes by as much as one might
have expected, as is evident in figure 3.1. The figure compares the
growth since 1971 in current nursing home residents to the growth in
the population over the age of 755 From figure 3.1, we learn that
growth in nursing home residents has rapidly decelerated since 1971, in
spite of roughly constant rates of elderly population growth: spe-
cifically, in the mid 1970s, the resident population grew at a 4.8 percent
annual rate; by the early 1980s, this annual growth rate had plummeted
by almost two-thirds, to 1.7 percent; finally, in the late 1980s to early
1990s, the growth rate dropped further, to about 0.4 percent. This sharp
deceleration has occurred in spite of relatively stable growth rates for
the elderly population: the population over 75 has grown at a roughly
constant annual rate of 2.7 percent for the past two decades. During the
1970s, the resident population grew twice as quickly as the elderly pop-
ulation, but during the 1980s and early 1990s, the resident population
grew at less than half the rate of population. In fact, per capita output
contracted so sharply during the 1980s that it more than offset the per
capita growth that occurred during the 1970s. It is remarkable that,
from 1971 to 1995, per capita output fell by almost 20 percent overall, in
spite of a concerted attempt by policymakers to expand the availability
of nursing home care.
The trend toward publicly subsidized long-term care, coupled with
the decelerating demand for it, raises two questions about the impactYear
Figure 3.1
Relative growth of nationwide nursing home residents versus relative growth of elderly
population
Source: Lakdawalla and Philipson 1999.
of aging on the growth of long-term care markets. First, why did the
per capita output of long-term care increase substantially duringthe
1970s but decline even more substantially thereafter? From 1971 to
1991 overall, the per capita output of nursing home care actually de-
clined somewhat, in spite of dramatic increases in public subsidies for
nursing homes. Second, if public financing has not significantly raised
per capita output, how has it otherwise changed the marketfor
long-term care? This article summarizes our previous analysis of the
forces governing the impact of aging on long-term care markets6 and
extends it by examining the impact of public demand subsidies.
Figure 3.1 suggests that aging alone is an insufficient explanation for
trends in nursing home output: the elderly population has grown at a
constant rate, but rates of growth in nursing home output have varied
enormously. Therefore, we focus not on aging itself but on two related
forces that affect the demand for nursing home care: the overall disabil-
ity of the elderly population and the rate of marriage among the el-
derly. Naturally, when disability rises, the demand for nursing home
care rises. When the rate of marriage rises, however, the demand for
nursing home care falls because a spouse can function as a caregiver at
home and thus represents a ready substitute for nursing home care.
Healthy aging not only lowers nursing home demand but also raises
the supply of substitutes for nursing home care. Our previous research
argued that rising per capita output during the 1970s appears to be
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explained by substantial reductions in the rate of marriage and the lack
of significant reductions in disability. In contrast, falling per capita out-
put during the 1980s seems to be explained by declining disability and
stable rates of marriage. By means of these two forces, growth in the el-
derly population, or aging, can actually lower demand for nursing
home care, as appears to have been the case. If the healthy elderly pop-
ulation grows more rapidly than the disabled population, the per ca-
pita supply of healthy caregivers rises and nursing home demand falls.
Similarly, if the population of elderly males grows more rapidly than
the population of elderly females, the per capita supply of spousal
caregivers rises and nursing home demand falls.
We extend our earlier analysis by discussing how these arguments
are affected by public financing. We first document the growth in pub-
lic financing over the last forty years and then break it down into its
component parts. We show that public expenditures have grown
nearly ten times as rapidly as private expenditures on nursing homes
and that nearly all of this growth can be attributed to growth in the rel-
ative quantity of public bed-days, rather than growth in its relative
price. Therefore, the share of consumers affected by subsidization has
grown extensively. We argue that this growth is not entirely due to eli-
gibility expansion and that part of this exponential growth would have
occurred in the presence of constant eligibility because eligibility is en-
dogenous. Individuals can make themselves eligible by distorting their
savings and consumption, and "spending down" to qualify for subsi-
dies. Endogenous eligibility coupled with the upward pressure on pri-
vate prices induced by aging may be partly responsible for the
exponential growth in Medicaid budgets. We also analyze how this en-
dogenous spread of subsidization has changed the relative importance
of health and marriage in governing nursing home output. If nursing
homes are heavily subsidized, the presence of alternatives to nursing
home care, like spouses, becomes much less significant. For example, if
nursing homes are not subsidized, a spouse may be willing to quit
work and care for an ailing mate, but this may not be true if they are
heavily subsidized. We discuss the impacts of public demand subsidies
on the long-term care market.
II.The Slowing Demand for Long-Term Care
Here we summarize our previous analysis (Lakdawalla and Philipson
1999) of why per capita output initially rose during the 1970s but con-Public Financing and the Market for Long-Term Care 81
tracted even more sharply during the1980sand1990s.We cannot look
to public subsidies or Certificate of Need legislation alone as explana-
tions because they should have resulted in uniform expansion of nurs-
ing home output. We also cannot look to aging alone because a
constant rate of growth in the elderly population has coincided with
wide variation in the growth rates of nursing home output. Instead,
our analysis suggests several other important economic forces that
have increased the availability of substitutes for nursing home care.
This analysis reveals that aging can actually lower the demand for
nursing home care. It also helps us understand why the1970sdiffered
so sharply from the1980sand helps isolate the economic changes that
generated these differences.
We define long-term care as the continuing care of an individual
with a chronic disability. Our discussion is premised on the fact that
nursing home care is only one form of long-term care. Disabled people
may also receive care in their homes, for example, fromhealthy family
members or friends. This alternative has important implications for
nursing home demand. The increasing availability of substitutes for
nursing home care can play an important role in slowing the growth
in nursing home output. We focus on two particular determinants of
substitute care: the health of the elderly and the rate of marriage among
the elderly. Improvements in elderly health lower the demand for
nursing homes in two ways: they alleviate the need for long-term
care, but they also provide more healthy people whocould poten-
tially provide care at home, outside a nursing home setting. Simi-
larly, increases in the rate of marriage lower the demand for nursing
homes because a spouse represents a ready substitute for nursing
home care. The rate of marriage will increase among the elderly if the
share of elderly males rises: because elderly males are scarce relative to
females, expansion in the supply of males allows couples to stay mar-
ried longer.
If the longevity of elderly males rises while the longevity of elderly
females is constant, the per capita demand for nursing homes will fall.
Couples will stay married longer, and the rate of marriage rises. Ob-
serve that the per capita demand for nursing homes may fall, even
though overall longevity rises. Second, if the elderly spend additional
years in good health and no additional years in disability,the incidence
of disability in the population will fall, even though longevity rises. In
this case also, an increase in longevity coincides with a decrease in the
per capita demand for nursing home care. An important point here is82 Lakdawalla and Philipson
that healthy aging not only affects the demand side of the long-term
care market but also the supply side.
Aggregate changes in elderly health and in the share of elderly males
appear to explain why the 1970s look so different from the 1980s. Es-
sentially, during the 1970s, the share of elderly males dropped sharply
and brought down with it the rate of marriage. This drop helps explain
why per capita output grew so much. During the 1980s, however, the
share of elderly males stabilized, but there were substantial improve-
ments in the health of the elderly. This change pushed down the per ca-
pita output of nursing home care. A quick look at the aggregate
statistics illustrates the point. In the early 1970s, the male population
over age 75 grew at a mere 1.7 percent annual rate, while the female
population grew at a 3.4 percent annual rate; this disparity accounted
for the dramatic rise in per capita market care output witnessed during
the 1970s. By the early 1980s, this huge imbalance had been largely
wiped out because the male population was then growing at a 2.6 per-
cent annual rate while the female population was growing at a 2.9 per-
cent rate. As the 1980s progressed, the male population growth rate
caught up to and eventually even surpassed the female population
growth rate. During the 1970s, the ratio of males to females, which
roughly represents the share of women married, fell from 0.64 in 1970
to 0.55 in 1980 for the over 75 age group.7 As a result of this decline,
there were about 900,000 more unmarried elderly women in 1980 than
there would have been at the 1970 rate of marriage. This increase in
widowhood, substantial in relation to the 1.4 million nursing home res-
idents in 1980, helped push up per capita output for market care dur-
ing the 1970s. On the other hand, improvements in elderly health were
not very significant during the 1970s8 but substantial during the 1980s.
During the 1980s, increases in the relative health of the elderly have
served as a significant force slowing the rate of growth of market care.
In 1981, the incidence of disability among the population over 75 was
31.9 percent, while in 1991, this rate fell to 28.1 percent.9 Since there
were about 13.5 million people over age 75 in 1991, there were roughly
half a million fewer disabled persons over 75 in 1991 than there would
have been absent the disability reduction. This reduction in disability
would have substantially lowered the 1991 nursing home population
of 1.5 million people.1°
In our previous article (Lakdawalla and Philipson 1999), we present
more formal empirical evidence suggesting that growth in these twoPublic Financing and the Market for Long-Term Care 83
quantities, elderly health and the share of elderly males, reduces nurs-
ing home output. First, using data for a panel of counties on nursing
home residents and population, we test the prediction that increases in
the share of males decrease per capita market output. We find evidence
consistent with our predicted effects and in particular with the surpris-
ing negative effect of male aging on market care: a ten-percent-
age-point increase in the ratio of men per women appears to reduce the
per capita stock of nursing home residents by as much as 16 percent.
Next, we investigate whether or not the aggregate evidence on the gen-
der ratio effect is consistent with individual-level evidence. At the indi-
vidual level, we found that disability status and marital status were the
two most important predictors of whether an individual entered a
nursing home. Not surprisingly, able people almost never enter nurs-
ing homes, while severely disabled people nearly always do. However,
marital status has a quantitatively large effect on nursing home en-
trance. The presence of a spouse more than halves the probability of
nursing home entrance. This result is found to apply to all but the most
severely mentally impaired elderly and to most elderly parents. These
individual-level results are quite consistent with the findings of other
authors. Cutler and Sheiner (1994) and Borsch-Supan et al. (1991) find
that being married significantly lowers the probability of being in a
nursing home. Cohen et al. (1988) find that married people are less
likely ever to enter a nursing home, are likely to have fewer nursing
home entrances, and are likely to spend fewer days per year in a nurs-
ing home. Börsch-Supan (1990) finds that the loss of a spouse is the life
event most likely to trigger nursing home entrance; specifically, the loss
of a spouse increases more than tenfold the probability of transition from
independent to institutional living.
Finally, we use our estimated effects to explain the aggregate trends
depicted in figure 3.1. First, we use our panel county-level estimates
of the effect of changes in the gender ratio. From these estimates, we
calculate that aggregate changes in the gender ratio explain nearly
all (roughly 95 percent) of the per capita growth in nursing home out-
put from 1971 to 1980. Changes in the gender ratio are found to be
much more significant in explaining per capita output growth than
the massive Medicaid expansion that took place during the 1970s.
Second, we use our individual-level estimates of the effect of changes
in disability. From these estimates, we calculate that improvements in
disability during the 1980s explain over 80 percent of the decline in the84 Lakdawalla and Philipson
per capita output of nursing home care that took place during that
decade.
III.The Rise of Public Nursing Home Subsidies
To get a sense of the magnitude of the growth in public spending, con-
sider figure 3.2.11 Over the past forty years, public expenditures on
nursing home care have grown much more rapidly than private expen-
ditures. Even the rate of growth has been consistently higher for public
expenditures. Overall, public expenditures have grown ten times more
rapidly than private expenditures since 1960. This result reflects more
than just the lower initial value of public nursing home expenditures.
We can see this from figure 3312 This figure shows growth in public
and private expenditures since 1971. In 1971, the baseline values for
public and private spending were fairly similar: $2.16 billion in public
nursing home expenditures and $2.85 billion in private expenditures.
In spite of the similar initial values, public expenditures grew more
rapidly than private expenditures. The periods of the most rapid diver-
gence between private and public spending were the early to middle
1970s and the late 1980s to 1990s. There was some convergence during
the Reagan administration of the early 1980s. By the end of the entire
twenty-five-year period, however, public expenditures had grown
nearly twice as quickly as private expenditures.
Most of the divergence between public and private spending can be
attributed to relative growth in the quantity of public bed-days rather
than relative growth in public prices. Figure 3.4 shows the relative
growth since 1971in prices paid by Medicaid residents and
non-Medicaid residents.13 The price paid per day of care has actually
risen more rapidly for private payers than for Medicaid payers. In fact,
over this twenty-year period, private prices grew about twice as
quickly as Medicaid prices. From about 1980 onward, the growth in
private prices has been much more rapid than the growth in Medicaid
prices.
Thus, it is not surprising that there has been substantial growth in
the quantity of Medicaid bed-days relative to non-Medicaid bed-days.
Figure 3.5 illustrates this trend.14 Medicaid bed-days have grown by
nearly a factor of four over this twenty-year period, while non-
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The expansion in the quantity of output subsidized has been sub-
stantial and rapid. Public expenditures have grown much more quickly
than private expenditures because the quantity of subsidized bed-days
has grown more quickly than private expenditures. In fact, the only
source of growth for private expenditures has beensignificant growth
in private price per day. It is possible that the market has been seg-
mented into a small group of high-quality consumers who pay pri-
vately and a much larger group of lower-quality consumers who pay
publicly through Medicaid. The private portion of the market is now so
small that it can be composed entirely of consumers with a substantial
quality preference.
IV.Public Financing and Long-Term Care
The previous section documented the dramatic expansion, over the
past thirty years, in public subsidies for nursing home care. This sec-
tion argues that increases in the total demand for nursing home use
have driven up the share of subsidized demand. As the private price of
nursing home care rises, people have a greater incentive to qualify for
public subsidies. In addition, subsidization has made the effect of dis-
ability more important and the effect of marriage less important.
The Causes of Public Financing Growth
Someone who is not eligible for Medicaid can distort their inter-
temporal consumption by "spending down" resources to become eligi-
ble. This distortion could happen in one of several ways: primarily
through spending down or otherwise concealing their wealth, but per-
haps also by spending resources on lobbying the government to ex-
pand the eligibility rules)5 Every individual thus has three long-term
care choices: privately financed nursing home care, publiclyfinanced
nursing home care, or being cared for at home. As the quantity de-
manded of each choice changes with their relative prices, the value of
distorting consumption behavior rises. The price pressure induced by
aging thus raises the value of eligibility.
First, consider the effect of aging if the share of males falls, which oc-
curred during the 1970s. When spousal caregivers become scarce, the
net price of home care will rise. Furthermore, the increased per capita
demand for nursing home care pushes up the private market price for
care. Therefore, female aging induces substitutiontoward public88 Lakdawalla and Philipson
financing. During the 1970s, the share of males fell, suggesting that
publicly financed output should have become more attractive. We can
thus partly understand the 1970s expansion in public financing asa
substitution away from home care and away from privately financed
nursing home care. It was made possible at least in part by the reduc-
tion in the share of elderly males.
Next consider the effect of aging if the gender ratio and the incidence
of disability are held constant. In this case, the per capita demand for
nursing home care is constant: even though the elderly population
rises, each elderly person has access to the same number of healthy
family caregivers. Therefore, the net price of home care faced by each
disabled person remains constant. As the elderly populationgrows,
however, the overall demand for nursing home care must rise and
must push up the private nursing home price. Privately financed nurs-
ing homes become more expensive relative to home care and relative to
public financing. Aging thus increases home care and tends to encour-
age substitution toward public financing. This force would have had a
tendency to push up public financing during the 1980s, although it
could have been offset by the reductions in disability that occurred
during that decade. Overall, it is likely that demand rose according to
figure 3.4, which shows expansion in the price of nursing home care.
This is one possible explanation of why public subsidies continued to
expand during the 1980s.
Subsidies and the Demand for Long-Term Care
In a highly subsidized environment, the effects of gender and disability
change. The growth in public financing has made the gender effect less
important and the disability effect more important. Thus, it is likely
that in such an environment, marriage will come to play an increas-
ingly smaller role in the demand for nursing home care. Lakdawalla
and Philipson (2000) provide some evidence for the declining impor-
tance of marriage over time. They show that estimates of the marriage
effect based on 1980s data badly underpredict the growth inper capita
demand that occurred during the 1970s. On the other hand, estimates
based on 1970s data predict this growth almost perfectly. These results
seem consistent with a diminishing effect of marriage over time.
To understand the relationship between marriage and public
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the price p to enter a nursing home, but in the second, they may enter
free of charge. In addition, suppose that the net cost of providing
care to a spouse at home is distributed randomly throughout the popu-
lation but that it is always positive. When nursing homes are free,
disabled individuals always enter nursing homes, regardless of
whether or not they are married, because nursing homes are always
cheaper than spousal care. On the other hand, when nursing homes
cost p. the disabled enter nursing homes only if their spouses can-
not provide care for less than p. In other words, when the price falls,
a larger fraction of married, disabled people will enternursing homes.
At very low prices, even married people will enter nursing homes
with high probabilities. Therefore, when the price is very low, being
married does little to keep people out of nursing homes. High rates of
public subsidies drive the price down and make the marriage effect
smaller.
It is interesting to note that this analysis can also be applied in
reverse to help us understand subsidies for spousal care, which may
take various forms. Such reductions will intensify the effect of marriage
and can offset the effect of nursing home subsidies if they are
significant enough. Examples of subsidies to home care include Social
Security payments, which encourage spouses to retire and care for a
sick mate, or direct Medicaid payments for market-based home care.
Home health care is in fact strongly complementary with care by a fam-
ily member or spouse. Individuals frail enough to require home health
aides for a chronic problem are unlikely to be able to live without
family assistance as well. Ettner (1994) shows that the vast majority
of home health care users also receive care from family members.
The interaction between price and disability is also important. An
individual will enter a nursing home if her disability is high enough
relative to market prices for care. When the price falls, people with less
and less disability choose to enter nursing homes. At low prices, reduc-
tions in disability do less to keep people out of nursing homes because
even the moderately disabled are choosing to enter them. Consider
the extreme case where market care is free. In this case, every person
with the slightest health problem will choose to enter a nursing home.
Given such a situation, it would be nearly impossible to reduce the
nursing home population by improving health: nursing home resi-
dents would not move out of a home unless they became entirely
disability-free. In contrast, if nursing homes are very expensive, slight90 Lakdawalla and Philipson
reductions in disability might induce people to move out of a nursing
home.
V.Conclusions
This article provided a summary of our previous work on the impact of
aging on long-term care markets and has extended it to consider the
impact of public financing. The per capita output of nursing home care
rose dramatically during the 1970s but fell even more dramatically dur-
ing the 1980s. This fluctuation was in spite of constant growth in the el-
derly population. We have argued that aging itself is not at the heart of
nursing home output. What matters is the effect of aging on the avail-
ability of substitutes for nursing home care. We have examined in par-
ticular the effect of aging on the rate of marriage among the elderly and
on the incidence of disability. Healthy aging not only affects the de-
mand side of the long-term care market but also the supply side. When
the longevity of elderly males rises more than the longevity of elderly
females, the rate of marriage rises and spousal care becomes more
readily available. When the elderly spend additional years in good
health rather than in disability, the supply of healthy caregivers rises
and home care becomes more freely available. Therefore, relative
growth in the population of elderly males and in the healthy popula-
tion lowers the per capita demand for nursing home care at the same
time that it expands the supply of substitutes for nursing home care.
During the 1970s, the share of elderly males fell dramatically. This
change offers a feasible interpretation of the rapid expansion in the per
capita demand for nursing homes during the 1970s. However, during
the 1980s, the share of males held steady while the incidence of disabil-
ity fell. This finding suggests an interpretation for the declining per ca-
pita demand for nursing homes during the 1980s.
There has been fairly continuous expansion in the share of nursing
home bed-days that are subsidized. We showed that the quantity of
publicly financed output has risen dramatically relative to private out-
put, while public prices have declined relative to private prices. We
suggested that expansions in the share of publicly financed output are
in part the logical result of increases in private nursing home prices
brought about by aging. During the 1970s, there was a huge expansion
in the demand for long-term care as a result of increases in the elderly
population and as a result of reductions in the share of males. This up-
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output because more people were driven to make themselves eligible
for subsidies. Even during the 1980s, the growth in the elderly popula-
tion would have pushed up demand, as is evident in the price increases
observed during the 1980s. This increase in demand would have con-
tinued to raise public financing during the 1980s. Finally, we examined
the impact of this subsidy growth. Here, we argued that subsidies
make the effect of marriage less important and the effect of disability
more important. In a highly subsidized environment, the availability of
spousal care has less of an impact on demand because nursing home
care may actually be substantially cheaper than spousal care, even
when a spouse is present. On the other hand, when subsidies are high,
people may choose to enter nursing homes for comparatively minor
disabilities. Therefore, small increases in disability may have large ef-
fects on the nursing home population.
Naturally, the descriptive evidence examined here is only suggestive
of the forces we have stressed. However, it remains unquestionable
that endogenous eligibility will be an important factor in explaining
the impact of aging on both the price and quantity of publicly subsi-
dized nursing home care. As the population continues to age, these
forces will become increasingly important to the study and implemen-
tation of public finance.
Notes
We are thankful for the constructive comments provided on this as well as on related pre-
vious work by Gary Becker, Thomas DeLeire, Will Dow, Martin Gaynor, Paul Gertler,
Chulhee Lee, Casey Mulligan, Edward Norton, Richard Posner, and James Vaupel, as
well as seminar participants at the 1998 AEA Meetings. Philipson gratefully acknowl-
edges financial support from NIA (Grant ROl AG16494) and The Research Fellows Pro-
gram of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.
Data are taken from OECD 1998.
See National Center for Social Statistics (1974) for the 1971 Medicaid data; 1991 data
are based on HCIA (1996).
See Harrington et al. 1997.
The figure uses data on nursing home residents from the 1973, 1977, 1985, 1991, and
1995 National Nursing Home Surveys. (The raw data are reported in Strahan 1997.)
Intermediate years are interpolated, and data for 1971 to 1972 are extrapolated, assum-
ing constant rates of growth between observed points. Population data from 1970
to1995come fromtheNationalCenterforHealthStatisticsWebsite:
http://www.cdc.gov/nchswww/datawh/statabIunpubdImOTtflbSIpOp7O95.htm. The 1971 baseline
values are: 977,481 nursing home residents, and 7,877,000 people over age 75.92 Lakdawalla and Philipson
Most consumers in the long-term care market are above the age of 75. In 1995, about
17 percent of residents were 65 to 74, 42 percent between 75 and 85, and 41 percent above
85 years (National Center for Health Statistics 1995).
See Lakdawalla and Philipson 1999.
All calculations were performed using male and female age-specific population data
from the 1970-1991 issues of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services publi-
cation, Vital Statistics of the United States.
See, for example, Crimmins et al. 1997.
These rates are calculated from disability incidence estimates for people of ages 75-84,
and over 85; all these estimates are taken from Manton et al. 1997. These estimates are
converted into rates for people over 75 by using population data from Vital Statistics of the
United States.
The data on nationwide nursing home residents are taken from Strahan 1997.
The expenditure series is constructed from data in Levit et al. 1997; Letsch et al. 1992;
and Waldo, Levit, and Lazenby 1986. The base 1960 values are $100 million in public
nursing home expenditures and $800 million in private expenditures.
The expenditure series is constructed from data in Levit et al. 1997; Letsch etal. 1992;
and Waldo, Levit, and Lazenby 1986. The base 1971 values are $2.16 billion in public
nursing home expenditures and $2.85 billion in private expenditures.
Both price series are calculated by dividing total expenditures by total bed-days. The
Medicaid and non-Medicaid expenditure series are taken from Levit et al. 1997; Letsch
et al. 1992; and Waldo, Levit, and Lazenby 1986. Data on total residents (converted to
bed-days by multiplying by 365) are taken from the 1973, 1977, 1985, and 1991 National
Nursing Home Surveys. (The raw data are reported in Strahan 1997.) The 1991 value for
the share of Medicaid bed-days is taken from HCIA 1996, while the 1971 value is con-
structed by taking the total statewide number of Medicaid bed-days (National Center for
Social Statistics 1974) and dividing this number by an estimate of total statewide 1971
bed-days from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1996. Intermediate
years are then linearly interpolated.
Data on total residents (converted to bed-days by multiplying by 365) are taken from
the 1973, 1977, 1985, and 1991 National Nursing Home Surveys. (The raw data are re-
ported in Strahan 1997.) The 1991 value for the share of Medicaid bed-days is taken from
HCIA 1996, while the 1971 value is constructed by taking the total statewide number of
Medicaid bed-days (National Center for Social Statistics 1974) and dividing this number
by an estimate of total statewide 1971 bed-days from the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services 1996. Intermediate years are then linearly interpolated.
The idea of endogenous lobbying effort is explored more fully in Becker 1983.
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